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THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES
EDWIN AL BoRcHARD*
The common law and other legal systems long professed the
assumption that it was necessary to commit physical damage or
injury (a wrong) or to threaten an immediate injury, before the
protection of the courts could be invoked by the person requiring
judicial protection. It was apparently not sufficiently realized
that rights may be impaired and disturbed and injuries suffered
by the mere assertion of claims which throw rights into doubt,
uncertainty, and jeopardy. So the mere unfounded assertion
that a person is married or unmarried, illegitimate, insane; the
mere fact that title to property is challenged; the mere fact that
disputes exist as to the construction of instruments, such as contracts, deeds, leases, will, etc., create situations which endanger
or impair rights and which, in order to prevent even greater damage, require clarification and determination. The private interests
-the freedom of action or disposition-and the social equilibrium
are both disturbed when rights are thus endangered or impaired
by unfounded claims. Indeed, the courts of equity have long
recognized that an action lies to quiet the title to property if the
title is challenged; and statutes have given a right of action to
conflicting claimants, both of real and personal property. So
actions are allowed to have a void marriage or void instruments
so declared and to construe wills.
*Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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But to secure a judicial construction of contracts, deeds, and
leases, and of other legal relations, it is still necessary-in the absence of statutes authorizing actions for declaratory judgmentsto purport to break or violate them, in order to bring them before
a court for construction and determination. It is thus necessary
in many instances to act at one's peril in order to find out one's
rights and obtain a judicial decision of a dispute. Not all questions of civil status or all disputes as to property rights can yet (except by way of declaratory judgment) be determined without
prior violence. It is to remedy these defects, so as to enable parties,
to obtain authoritative decisions as to their rights-not before a
controversy has arisen, but before either party has necessarily
acted on his own interpretation of his supposed rights-that the
declaratory judgment exists, and that it has now been adopted,
as an efficient instrument of preventive justice, in the codes of procedure of many civilized countries, including some 25 American
states. It is also used as a substitute for an executory judgment,
when a plaintiff is satisfied with a judicial declaration of his rights
and prefers to avoid too great a breach of relations with his opponent. By narrowing the issue, with resulting speed of determination, it prevents much hostile and prolonged litigation.
A declaratory judgment in form differs from an executory
judgment only in the fact that it does not carry as an appendix a
decree of execution. It declares the existence of a legal relation
arising out of a written instrument or other circumstances, and
that is all the relief that the plaintiff desires or needs. It is a
final binding determination of the rights of the parties, hence can
be rendered only where there are adverse parties in litigation and
when all the parties in interest have been cited before the court.
There must be an existing controversy as to their respective rights,
and the court must be convinced that the judgment will serve a
useful purpose in settling the issue. Its grant, therefore, is discretionary with the court, a discretion which, by long practice, has
in part hardened into rule.
Constitutionality. These necessary conditions of a declaratory
judgment sufficiently indicate that it differs radically from an
advisory opinion (which binds no one, not even the court that
renders it, and requires no adverse parties or litigated issues) and
from the moot case (which involves issues that are fictitious, abstract, hypothetical, academic, or dead). Only two courts out of
some twenty-five in the United States have thought the declaratory judgment unconstitutional, namely, the Michigan Supreme
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Court (1919) and the United States Supreme Court, in dicta. To
reach this conclusion, each has assumed that the declaratory judgment involved either an advisory opinion without adverse litigating
parties contesting a genuine issue, or else a moot case.' Such
misconceptions cannot permanently prevail. The Michigan court
in 1930 overruled its 1919 decision, so that the Federal Supreme
Court now stands alone.- In twelve states the supreme courts,
in considered opinions, have unanimously concluded that the
declaratory judgment is as constitutional as any other final judgment of a court ; and in the other thirteen states its constitutionality has apparently been regarded as too obvious to require discussion.
The Federal Supreme Court has not had occasion to pass on
the constitutionality of any declaratory judgment statute, so
that its utterances are dicta. That misconceptions seem to prevail
in that court as to the function and scope of a declaratory judgment is evident from the fact that the Liberty Warehouse case and
the Willing case have been cited in support of the propositions
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 S. Ct. 282 (1927);
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 507 (1928);
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350 (1919).
-Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 229 N. W. 618 (Mich. 1930).
The court in part relies upon the fact that a 1929 Michigan Declaratory
Judgments Act provides for such judgments in "cases of actual controversies," whereas the 1919 Act was silent on this point. The Michigan
court in the Anway case indulged the unfounded assumption that the 1919
Act required the court to decide moot cases and render advisory opinions.
The Michigan decision in the Anway case received the condemnation of
practically all the commentators who discussed it: (1920) 6 A. B. A. J. 145;
(1921) 7 ibid. 141; (1921) CoL. L. REv. 168; (1922) 7 CORN. L. Q. 255;
(1922) 4 ILL. L. Q. 126; (1920) 19 1%rcH. L. REV. 86; (1921) 5 MiNN. L. REv.
172; Rice in (1921) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 1; (1920) 30 YALE L. J. 161.
'Arizona: Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., 283 Pac. 281 (Ariz. 1929);
California: Blakeslee v. Wilson, 190 Cal. 479, 213 Pac. 495, 8 IowA L. BULL.
272 (1923); Connctiut: Braman v. Babcock, 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150,
152 (1923); Florida: Sheldon v. Powell, 128 So. 258 (Fla. 1930); Indiana:
Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930); Kansas: State ex rel.
Hopkins v. Grove, 109 Kan. 619, 201 Pac. 82 (1922); Michigan: Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 229 N. W. 618 (Mich.
1930); "New Jersey: McCrory Stores Corp. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 102
N. J.L. 590, 134 Atl. 752 (1926); New York:
Board of Education v. Van
Zandt, 119 Misc. Rep. 124, 195 N. Y. S. 297 (1922); Pennsylvania: In re
Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925); Tennessee: Miller v.
Miller, 149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. V. 965 (1923); Virginia: Patterson's Ex'rs.
v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 131 S. E. 217 (1926).
The decisions in these
cases (except for one dissent in New Jersey, without stated reasons) were by
unanimous courts.
Statutes authorizing declaratory judgments have now been adopted in the
following states besides in those mentioned above: Colorado, Hawaii (ter.),
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
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that the Court will not render advisory opinions or decide moot
cases' or pass on conclusions of an administrative body.: It would
seem clear, however, that an action for a declaratory judgment
differs in no respect from any other action except in the fact that
a coercive or executory decree does not attach to the judgment, so
that there would seem to be little occasion to confound it with
an advisory opinion or a moot case. Some of the confusion appears
to go back to the Muskrat case,8 which was invoked both by the
Michigan Supreme Court in the Anway case and by Mr. Justice
Sanford in the Liberty Warehouse case. In the Muskrat case Congress had authorized certain named Indians to institute an action
in the Court of Claims to test the constitutionality of a prior
statute concerning Indian lands. There was no evidence that
Muskrat had any interest in the lands, that the Attorney General
had any conflicting interest, or that the court's judgment could
affect any specific property or legal relations. Such a proceeding lacked every element of a justiciable controversy. The obvious distinctions between the Muskrat case and an action for a
declaratory judgment were pointed out by Charles E. Hughes,
now Chief Justice Hughes, in 1920.' It is fundamental to an
action for a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff must have a
definite legal interest capable and worthy of judicial protection,
that the defendant must have an adverse interest, and that the
judgment, definitely affecting legal relations placed in issue, be
res judicata. These constitute the elements and the only elements
5Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 131, 47 S. Ct. 511
(1927); Rz parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 454, 49 S. Ct. 411 (1929)
("a duty to give decisions which are advisory only, and so without forco
as judicial judgments, may be laid on a legislative court, but not on a
constitutional court established under Art. III").
6 Barker Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, etc., 281 U. S. 462, 50 S. Ct. 356
(1930), by Holmes, J., in which it is said, citing the Willing case as
authority, that a court "cannot be required to go into general propositions
or prophetic statements of how it is likely to act upon other possible or even
probable issues that have not yet arisen."
7 In Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 50 S.
Ct. 389 (1930), the Supreme Court (by Van Devanter, J.) cites the Liberty
Warehouse and the Willing case to the proposition that "the court cannot
give decisions which are merely advisory" or exercise "functions which are
essentially legislative or administrative."
8219 U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. (1911).
9 45 A. B. A. Rep. 266 (1920) and (1920) 91 CENT. L. J. 435.
10West v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 234 Pac. 978 (1925) ; Revis v. Daugherty,
215 Ky. 823, 287 S. W. 28 (1926) ; Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 98 N. J. Eq.
85, 129 At. 617 (1925); In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl.
In Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 Ur. S. 274,
265, 270 (1925).
48 S. Ct. 507, 509 (1928), the Court seemed to infer that the assertion
by the lessees of the Chicago Auditorium and the denial by the lessors (in
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of an adversary judicial action, or of a "case or controversy," as
it is commonly called. It is not necessary that a judgment carry
That the Supreme
execution in order that it be a judgment.'
there are constituthat
Court seems to be departing from its view
be inferred from
may
tional objections to the declaratory judgment
its latest dictum to the effect that "such a remedy is not within
either the statutory or the equity jurisdiction of federal courts."'"
While it is quite true that as yet a federal statute has not been
enacted, though it twice passed the House of Representatives, the
statement that such relief is not within the equitable jurisdiction
of the federal courts is questionable, for not only the English
and coloniaP' courts, but practically all American courts,' includan action for quieting title and removing a cloud) that the lessees were
privileged under the lease to tear down the building and erect a new one
was not a justiciable controversy (though forfeiture of long-term leases was
in jeopardy), but a friendly doubt or difference of opinion, inappropriite
That it was a most hostile proceeding, involving
for judicial determination.
millions of dollars, and not at all a friendly difference of opinion, would
Somewhat similar cases were properly held
seem to appear from the record.
justiciable controversies in Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theaters, 284 Pac.
350 (Ariz. 1930); Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 229 N. W. 618
(Mich. 1930); Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140
Atl. 506 (1928).
n"When adverse litigants are present in court, and there is a real controversy between them, a final decision rendered in any form of proceeding
of which the court has jurisdiction is a judgment, whether or not execation
may follow." In 'e Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 AtI. 265, 270 (1925).
In Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 132, 47 S. Ct. 511
(1927), the Supreme Court said: "While ordinarily a case or judicial controversy results in a judgment requiring award of process of execution to
carry it into effect, such relief is not an indispensable adjunct of the
This was amply reexercise of the judicial function," citing cases.
affirmed in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279
U. S. 716, 725, 49 S. Ct. 499 (1929), by Chief Justice Taft, so that this
particular question, which troubled Mr. Justice Sanford in the Liberty
Warehouse case, may be deemed to have been set at rest.
"Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 477,
50 S. Ct. 192 (1930).
=In Guaranty Trust Co. v. rannay [1915] 2 K. B. 536, the English
Court of Appeal held the action to be purely a matter of procedure and considered that courts of equity always had the power to render declaratory
judgments. See Bankes, L. J., "I cannot doubt that had the Court of
Chancery in those days (before 1852) thought it expedient to make merely
declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised the right to
See F. W. Grinnel in (1928) 13 MAss. L. Q. 43, at 52.
do so."
"Hollard v. Oflivier, 1 New Zealand S. C. R. 197 (1881): "This is a
mere matter of procedure," and the court assumed that it had power to
This power was reaffiirmed, even in the
make a declaratory decree.
absence of statute, in Dufaur v. Kenealy, 28 N.Z.R. 269 (1908).
"See the actions for quieting title, declaring an alleged cloud nonexistent, determining disputed claims to property, declaring the status of
persons, referred to hereafter.
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ing the United States Supreme Court,' have for years rendered
declaratory judgments without special statutory authority and
without using the word "declaratory" or "declaration."
Those
words have induced a little confusion, which the Massachusetts and
Kansas statutes have sought to avoid by substituting for the term
judicial "declaration" of rights, the equivalent term "determination" or "adjudication" of rights. '
Declaratoryand Investitive Judgments. Judgments that merely declare the rights of the parties fall into two classes: (a) those
which declare pre-existing rights and (b) those which create new
legal relations. In fact all judgments fall into these groups,
though some are accompanied by a decree of execution and some
are not. It is to class (a) that the name declaratory judgments
is properly confined. The judgments in class (b), though not followed by execution, are better characterized as investitive or constitutive, because they create something new. These include judgments of adoption, divorce, changing names, naturalization, partition, forfeiture, foreclosure, establishing school districts, drains
and irrigation canals, highways and their improvements, line
fences, appointing guardians, receivers, admitting a will to probate, etc.
Declaratory Judgment of the Common Law. For centuries
the courts of practically all countries, and long before the enactment of statutes expressly authorizing declaratory judgments,
See the suits brought by one state against another to determine the location
of a disputed boundary line. Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1, 26 S.
Ct. 408 (1906); Arkansas v. Tennesee, 246 U. S. 158, 38 S. Ct. 301 (1918);
Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U. S. 516, 42 S. Ct. 173 (1922). One of
the clearest cases is Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S.
123, 131, 47 S. Ct. 511 (1927), in which the court sustained a Kansas
ordinance which authorized a city to bring proceedings against the taxpayers for a declaration that certain public improvements were legally
carried out and that the bonds issued pursuant thereto were binding obligations
of the city. Said Mr. Justice Stone, for the Court:
"That the issues
thus raised and judicially determined would constitute a case or controversy
if raised and determined in a suit brought by the taxpayer to enjoin further
proceedings under the ordinance could not fairly be questioned.
Cf. Risty
v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 46 S. Ct. 236 (1926). They
cannot be deemed any the less so because through a modified procedure the
parties are reversed and the same issues are raised and finally determined
at the behest of the city." The action in question resembles the bond
validating actions authorized by statute in California, Florida, Georgia, and
Mississippi.
' See Massachusetts, Statutes 1929, c. 186, and Rules and Procedure thereunder; (1929) 14 MAss. L. Q. 1. Kansas, Act of 1921, c. 168, Rev. St. 1923,
60-3127 et seq.
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have been rendering judgments determining the (pre-existing)
righis of the litigants, final judgments incapable of specific execution and the execution of which is unnecessary. These judgments have found their greatest utility in the determination of conflicting claims with respect to (a) status, (b) the ownership of
or other rights in property, or (c) other legal relations, and (d)
the construction and interpretation of written instruments. With
or without express statutory authorization, the necessities of organized communal life have compelled the recognition of the efficacy
of the declaratory judgment as a means of terminating legal controversies.
In the field of status, we have long been familiar with actions
for the declaration of the nullity of void marriages or divorces,'
for the declaration of legitimacy, illegitimacy, paternity, for the
declaration of the validity of a marriage,"0 for the declaration of
heirship,' etc.
In the field of property rights, equity has long recognized that
disputes as to ownership or possession of property can effectively
be determined by a judgment which merely declares the rights of
the parties. Since the abolition of real actions in England, this
is now the regular method of trying title. Some of the restrictions
with which the equitable action for removing a cloud from title
is encumbered have led to the enactment of statutes in many states
enabling not merely a person in possession, but any claimant of an
equitable or legal interest in land (and in some states even in
personal property), to institute an action for the trial of the title.'
Equity has recognized that it is in the public as well as in the
private interest that certainty shall prevail in the ownership and
right to possession of property. -2 The mere assertion of adverse
claims has thus been regarded as a harassment of the person in
IsNorman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143 (1898) CAL.. ciV. CODE, § 80;
Corkum v. Clark, 263 Mass. 378, 161 N. E. 912 (1928).
"Tillinghast v. Tillinghast, 25 Fed. (2d) 531 (D. C. 1928); Kitzman v.
Kitzman, 167 Wis. 308, 166 N. W. 789 (1918).
"ICAL. CODE Op Civ. PRoc. § 1664; Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg. Co.,
86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378 (1902) ; NEBRASKA R. S. 1913, § 1496, discussed in
Miller v. Clausen, 299 Fed. 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
"IThe statutes are cited in 6 PomERoy, EQUITY JURISDICTION (3d ed. 1905),

§ 735. See also Wehiman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 15 S. Ct. 129 (1894).

See Conn. Pub. Acts 1915, c. 174, § 1; Ackerman v. Union & New Haven
TruSt Co., 90 Conn. 63, 96 Atl. 149 (1915); 32 Cyc. 1296.
2Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 12 S. Ct. 720 (1892). As to bills
of peace, see POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed.) § 243 et seq.
Quieting title, Porter v. Reed, 123 Mo. 587, 27 S. W. 351 (1894).
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possession' and, under circumstances, of a claimant out of possession.' The fact is that the power to quiet the title to and remove
clouds from property is but an illustration of the general power
of courts of equity to quiet disputed or endangered rights generally; and, so far as concerns equitable interests, chancery courts
never lacked that power. It would have been proper to
exercise it in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, instead
of dismissing the parties, after an expensive litigation in a case
involving millions of dollars and important public improvements,
with the remark that the court was unable to determine their dispute in an action to remove a cloud from the title, because
what the plaintiff was seeking was in effect a declaratory judgment. Even without statutory authority to render such judgments, it is submitted that a court of equity had the power to decide whether the lessee was or was not privileged without forfeiture
to tear down the Chicago Auditorium.'
Our law is familiar with the declaration of other legal relations. For example, a cestui que trust can obtain a judgment declaring the plaintiff to be cestui and thus impressing a trust upon
the legal title of another;' or declaring a supposed trust to be invalid.' The trustee's or other fiduciary's action for instructions,
when adversary in character, is an exemplification of a time-honored declaratory judgment.' The bill of interpleader by a stake"McArthur v. Hood Rubber Co., 221 Mass. 372, 109 N. E. 162 (1915);
Berwyn Estates v. Varlese, 150 Atl. 342 (N. J. 1930); Whitehouse v. Jones,
60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906).
Gage v. Abbott, 99 Ill. 366 (1881); Dull's Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 510, 6
Atl. 540 (1886); 4 POMEROY, op. cit., § 1378, n. 1.
Our law is familiar with actions to determine the location of disputed
boundary lines: Georgia v. South Carolina, 257 U. S. 516, 42 S. Ct. 173
(1922); Spencer v. Mack, 151 Atl. 309 (Conn. 1930); and with actions to
determine the existence of rights of way or easements: Greene v. Canny, 137
Mass. 64, 70 (1884); Oddo v. Sabin, 151 Atl. 289 (N. J. Eq. 1930).
mIt is not at all clear that the court was correct in holding that the cloud
on the title, whose removal was sought, could not be derived from the lease
See Professor Langmaid's
itself, but only from some extraneous source.
criticism of Willing v. Chicago Auditorium in 23 ILL. L. Rsv. 595 (Feb. (1929).
The C. C. A. had considered the matter so important that they concluded that
the lessor's refusal to permit destruction of the building might constitute
a cloud on the lessee's title. 20 Fed. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 7th 1927).
OBrainard v. Buck, 184 U. S. 99, 22 S. Ct. 458 (1902); Donohoe v.
Rogers, 168 Cal. 700, 144 Pac. 958 (1914); Porten v. Peterson, 139 Minn. 152,
166 N. W. 183 (1918); State Lumber Co. v. Cuddigan, 150 Atl. 760 (R. I.
1930).
2
'Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 X. W. 660 (1917).
-2Penington v. Commonwealth Const. Co., 151 Atl. 228 (Del. 1930), (action
by receiver to have determined the distributive shares of various classes of
stockholders in an insolvent corporation); Sackett v. Paine, 46 R. I.
439, 128 Atl. 209 (1925). See 39 Cyc. 319.
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holder who admits that a duty is owing from him to one or more
cited persons, but, disclaiming knowledge of which one or more of
several persons is the entitled creditor, is a petition for a judgment
determining which is the proper claimant."
Among the better-known actions for the construction of written
instruments-actions which are in effect declaratory-are those
for the construction of wills. While those who can raise the issue
are usually few in number, e. g., executors, trustees, or cestuis que
trustest, in several states a more liberal doctrine prevails, so that
any one interested under a will may challenge the rights of those
who set up adverse claims."
Actions are not infrequent seeking the declaration of the
nullity of instruments or transactions, although usually incidentally
to further relief.' When brought by prospective legal defendants
to anticipate their defenses under void or voidable instruments,
they are declaratory actions. In this category belong actions by insurance companies to declare the invalidity of policies obtained by
fraud, sometimes before any loss has occurred; or by those prosActions,
pectively liable under negotiable instruments.'
declaratory in effect, are authorized in some states proving the
tenor of lost or spoliated instruments or proving the validity, when
contested, of instruments to be recorded. ' In California, Colorado,
Idaho, and Nebraska provision is made for the establishment of
irrigation districts and for the institution of an action in rem by
the commissioners or directors of the district, citing as defendants
the District, the Attorney General or taxpayers, to have the court
determine that the proceedings were properly undertaken, that
' Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. De Lasaux, 336 Ill. 522, 168 N. E. 640 (1929),
The bill of interpleader
which mentions the four conditions of such a bill.
See
by a stakeholder is one of the oldest forms of declaratory action.
PomERoy, EQurrABLE REmYIEs (1905) § 43 et seg.
"Mechanics' Bank v. Yale University, 150 Atl. 526 (Conn. 1930) ; Monypeny
v. Monypeny, 202 N. Y. 90, 95 N. E. 1. (1911); POmEOY, EQuITy JuRisPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) § 1157; 40 Cyc. 1841.
"Slingerland v. Slingerland, 109 Minn. 407, 410, 124 N. W. 19 (1910),
action to declare void a contract for the release of dower: Struthers Coal &
Coke Co. v. Union Trust Co., 227 Pa. 29, 75 Atl. 986 (1910).
"Commercial Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. MeLoon, 14 Allen 351 (Mass. 1867);
Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reals, 79 N. Y. 202 (1879). See NEw MExico
ACT of March 11, 1903, c. 23, § 2, which enables a corporation, anticipating a
suit against it for personal injury, to compel plaintiff to file his complaint.
So in prize law, The Zamora, (H. L.) [19161 2 A. C. 77. In Westchester
Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 246 N. Y. 194, 158 N. E. 71
(1927), an action was brought for a declaration that a certain note was
invalid for usury.
mCalifornia, Act of June 16, 1906, Stat. 1906, p. 604; CIV. CODE, § 203;
Title Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 305, 88 Pac. 356 (1907); In
re Bernhardt's Estate, 143 Atl. 92 (N. J. 1928) (establishing lost will).
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the district is lawfully established, and that the bonds issued for
the execution of the irrigation works are valid obligations." Not
greatly dissimilar are the so-called bond validating statutes of California, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi,' which by implication
have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.'
When au Alternative and when an Exclusive Remedij. The
fact that no coercive decree is sought or is attached to the judgment enables actions to be brought for a declaratory judgment on
two different types of operative facts: (a) those which might just
as readily have justified an action for executory or coercive relief;
and (b) those which are not susceptible of any other relief.
(a) In the former type of case, de~aratory relief is an alternative remedy. It is invoked in cases where the plaintiff is satisfied with a declaration that the defendant owes him a certain duty
or that the defendant is under a disability. For example, a taxpayer contesting the validity of a tax assessment can, instead of
an injunction or resisting enforcement proceedings, bring an action
for a declaratory judgment that the city or state is not empowered
to levy a certain tax or (if the plaintiff has the necessary interest)
enforce a certain law.f A declaratory judgment in these cases
enables a speedy determination of issues the clarification of which
is necessary both in the public and private interest. Were declaratory judgments universally authorized, it would not be necessary
to abuse the injunction-now so widely under attack-in order to
render what is in effect and purpose a declaratory judgment.'
The statutes, with supporting cases, are quoted or cited in 33 C. J. 1099,
1100.
2 Ingram v. City of Palmetto, 93 Fla. 790, 112 So. 861 (1927): Baker v.
City of Cartersville, 127 Ga. 221, 56 S. E. 249 (1906); Miller v. Silver Creek
California provides
Separate School Dist., 131 Miss. 702, 95 So. 688 (1923).
for sanitary bonds, irrigation bonds, water bonds, public utility bonds and
Cal. Stat. 1891, 1907, 1913, 1915, 1921.
otherp.
Gidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 S. Ct.

511 (1927).
3'Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186 (Ind. 1930); Little v. Smith, 124 Kan.
237, 257 Pac. 959 (1927) ; Pettit v. White County, 152 Tenn. 660, 280 S. W. 688
(192); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565

(1927).
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 573
(1925), where the statute enjoined was not to come into force for three
years after enactment, hence there was no imminence of wrong or loss. The
proper relief was a declaratory judgment which actually was rendered under
See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
cover of an injunction.
272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), where injunction against zoning law
was issued; cf. West v. City of Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 267, 234 Pae. 978,
979 (1925), where declaratory judgment was refused, because plaintiff
did not state specifically enough the purpose for which he desired to use his
property.
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The termination of litigation between private parties may also
often be better accomplished by an action for declaratory relief
than by a harsher action, and there is no reason why the law
should not foster the seeking of mild rather than harsh and destructive relief if that satisfies the plaintiff and determines the
issue. This occurs often in cases where a lessee desires to sublet,
but is refused permission thereto by the landlord, and seeks to
have his rights determined. For example, in Mill v. Cannon Brewery Co." the plaintiff was a lessee of premises belonging to the defendant. The lease contained a provision restricting the right to
assign or sublet without the landlord's consent. The plaintiff,
desiring to sublet to H but being unable to get the landlord's consent and unwilling to risk forfeiture, brought an action for a
declaration against the landlord that his refusal to consent was
arbitrary and that the plaintiff was privileged to assign to H.
The declaratory judgment requested was granted and much damage saved. While the lessee could, under the more conventional
forms of action, have sued for damages, he would have had to
move out and perhaps break the lease to do so advantageously.
Nor could he practically have sublet without the consent, for the
sub-tenant would have bought merely a lawsuit.'0 Actions for
declaratory judgments instead of actions for replevin," for damages,' or for specific performance" are often brought and are en31 [1920] 2 Ch. 38; see similar eases in Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. Rep.
469, 205 N. Y. S. 760 (1924); Young v. Ashley Gardens Properties, Ltd.,
[1903] 2 Ch. 112.
"oMr. Carmody, in his work on New York Practice (1923) § 304, recites
the facts of a parallel case under the conventional procedure, namely, Broadway and 94th St. Inc., landlord v. C. & L. Lunch Co., tenant, 116 Misc. Rep.
440, 190 N. Y. S. 563 (1921): "The plaintiff was a lessee of certain
premises belonging to the defendant.
The lease contained a provision restricting plaintiff's right to assign or sublet without landlord's consent.
Plaintiff, desiring to assign the lease to W and being unable to get the
landlord's consent, assigned to W without it, but the sublease was conditioned
upon the undisputed and undisturbed possession of W for a period. W went
into possession. The landlord gave notice of termination of the lease, rejected
W as a tenant and notified W that the supply of steam and hot water would
be discontinued. W vacated the premises, the tenant resumed possession. He
refused to pay rent. The landlord brought this summary proceeding to recover
possession of the premises. The tenant counterclaimed in the summary proceeding for damages sustained through the landlord's breach of this convenant
of the lease by refusing to give his consent to the subletting. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the tenant in the sum of $7,045.19."1
"H. Newsum & Co. v. Bradley, [1917] 2 K B. 112, 86 L. 5. K. B. 1238;
Elliott Steam Tug Co. v. John Payne & Co., [1920] 2 K B. 693.
"Barwich v. South Eastern & Chatham Rail Co., [1920] 2 X. B. 387; Millett
v. Van Heek & Co., [1920] 3 K. B. 535.
"Sheldon v. Powell, 128 So. 258 (Fla. 1930), where action for declaratory
judgment was approved, though it was admitted that action for release of
a legacy to plaintiffs would also have lain; Grindell v. Bass, [1920] 2 Ch. 487.
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couraged rather than discouraged, partly because they enable the
issues to be determined in a more peaceful atmosphere, partly because they are more expeditious, and partly because they save
destruction of values, of contracts, of business relations. Why
should it be necessary, as it now is, to break or purport to break a
contract to obtain its judicial interpretation or construction? In
an industrial age operating under long-term contracts, disputes
are bound to arise. It seems a most inefficient and expensive form
of deciding disputes to compel either party to breach the contract
or, at his peril, act upon his own interpretation of its meaning, as
a condition of a judicial decision upon the merits of a dispute.
England and much of the rest of the English-speaking world discovered that fact long ago. An industrial state would do well to
adopt this simple measure of reform, which would save much waste
and promote orderly economic relations.
But even if no advantages by way of peaceful settlement, expeditiousness, or economy are apparent to the court, why should a
plaintiff not be permitted to choose his own form of relief, rather
than a harsher or more conventional one? If a New York woman
prefers to sue her husband for a declaratory judgment that his
M/lexican divorce is invalid rather than for an annulment of his
second marriage in Connecticut, why should a court interfere?"
The tendency of some courts to permit the action for a declaration
only if it appears that no other form of action is available is quite
erroneous and should be stopped before it proceeds further.'
"The New York courts held the declaratory judgment to be a proper
procedure. Baumann v. Baumann, 22 App. Div. 460, 226 N. Y. S. 576 (1928),
250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
See also Dodge v. Campbell, 128
Misc. Rep. 778, 220 N. Y. S. 262 (1927); In re Phillips, [1919] 1 Ch. 128;
Bercsford v. Attorney General, [1918] P. 33.
'5These errors, it is submitted, have occurred in Loesch v. Manhattan Life
Ins. Co., 128 Misc. Rep. 232, 218 N. Y. S. 412 (1926), criticism in comment
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 403 and In re List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 Atl. 64
(1925), in which the court suggested, by way of dictum, that the declaratory
judgment could only be employed when no ordinary form of action was
available and that the main purpose of the declaratory procedure was to
insure a speedy determination of issues "which would otherwise be delayed,
to the possible injury of those interested, if they were compelled to await
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings."
There is no authority in
the history of the subject for such an unusual conclusion.
It is
indeed contrary to all authority. See also Kaleikau v. Hall, 27 Hawaii 420
(1923); Dempsey's Estate, 288 Pa. 458, 137 Atl. 170 (1927). The tendency
is particularly noticeable in Pennsylvania, where the declaratory judgment
was welcomed in 1925 in one of the most profound decisions of any of the
See
states. In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925).
the case note (Nov. 1930) 40 YALE L. J. 129.
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There is no authority for it in England, where most of the actions
for a declaration could doubtless have been brought for other
forms of relief also.' It conflicts, moreover, with the wording of
the authorizing statutes in this country and in England which empower the courts to render declaratory judgments "in any action
or proceeding . . . whtet7er or not further relief is or could be
cdaimed."' Its only proper application is to a case in which a
specific statutory remedy has been provided. Under those circumstances, it has commonly been held that, where jurisdiction
ot the particular type of case presented has been conferred on a
special tribunal, the plaintiff should be required to pursue the
statutory remedy especially provided.'
This principle that the declaratory judgment is an alternative
and not an exclusive remedy does not foreclose a court, in the exercise of its discretion, from declining to issue a declaration if it
considers that the decision will not terminate the issue or will not
serve a useful purpose or is inappropriate to the occasion. That
discretion is controlled by precedent and has to a considerable extent hardened into rule. But the mere fact that the plaintiff
might have availed himself of another form of action or relief is
not a sufficient ground for declining a declaration.
As already observed, by the terms of the statutes the plaintiff
may ask and the court issue a declaration "whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed". This clearly authorizes a prayer for
a declaration to be combined with a prayer for coercive relief, such
as an injunction, specific performance, or damages. The great
advantage of such combination is that, whereas the injunction or
other coercive relief may for technical reasons be declined, the
declaration may issue, and the plaintiff may thus succeed in his
" It is, however, the rule in actions involving title in India, where section
42 of the Specific Relief Act of 1877 provides: "4that no court shall make
any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief
than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so."
SAMAR, THE SPm-IFIc
RELm ACT (4th ed. 1922) 169. It was once the rule in Germany, 4 R. G.
437 (1881). See the development of the practice in (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 16-20.
'7 NEW YoRx CivmI P. &CTICE ACT, § 473; English Order XXV, Rule 5, of
1883; UNIFoRM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT, § 1.
See Miller v. Miller, 149
Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965, 967 (1924).
"Barraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615, 623; Bull v. Attl'y Gen. of N.
S. Wales [1916] 2 A. C. 564.
Claims for exemption from military service,
Mint v. Atty' Gen., [1918] 1 Ch. 216. Claims for exemption from taxation,
New York & Ottawa Ry. v. Cornwall, 29 Ont. L. B. 522 (1913).
Patent
eases, N. E. Marine Engineering v. Leeds, Forge & Co., [1906] 1 Ch. 324.
(1918) 28 YALE L. J. 114.
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main purpose to obtain an authoritative decision on his rights.
This, in fact, is a common practice."'
(b) The declaratory judgment can be sought, however,
under circumstances where no other form of relief is possible, a
function which has attracted major interest and which exemplifies some of the more striking social and economic advantages of
the procedure. The distinctive feature of this second group of
eases-in which the remedy often, though not necessarily, is exclusive-is that no injury or wrong need have been actually committed or threatened in order to enable the plaintiff to invoke the
judicial process; he need merely show that some legal interest or
right of his has been placed in jeopardy or grave uncertainty by
denial, by the existence of a potentially injurious instrument or
the occurrence of some unforeseen event or catastrophe, or by the
a&sertion of a conflicting claim by the defendant, e. g., that the
plaintiff claims she is the defendant's wife, which defendant denies-' that the defendant public official demands certain tax information, from the exaction of which plaintiff claims immunity ;
that defendant lessee demands the erection of a three-story fireproof garage under a lease (the old non-fireproof one having
burned), whereas plaintiff lessor maintains that he is privileged
to erect a two-story building, the new statutory limit for garages;'
that a state statute requires a heavy license fee from billiard parlors in one county only, whereas plaintiff asserts his immunity
therefrom on the ground of unconstitutionality ;' that plaintiff is
not under a duty to return to the defendant certain moneys paid
by defendant on forged bills of lading ;" that defendant asserts
plaintiff is bound to perform a contract for a future period, whereas plaintiff maintains he is not so bound ;' plaintiff claims in 1915
that he is no longer bound to perform certain long-term contracts
to deliver iron ore to the defendant from 1911 to 1919, on the
ground that war has abrogated the contracts ;" plaintiff claims, before the expiration of a contract, that he is entitled to a renewal
"Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buchner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927);
Islington Vestry v. Hornsey U. C., (C. A.) [1900] 1 Ch. 695; and the many
cases cited in (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 105 et seq.
'Baumann
v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
" 1Dyson v. Attorney-General, [1911] 1 K. B. 410, [1912] 1 Ch. 158.
u Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 Atl. 506 (1928).
Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565 (1927).
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, [1915] 2 K. B. 536.
ISociete Maritime et Commerciale v. Venus Steam Shipping Co.,
9 Com.
Cas. 289 (1904).
6
Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., (H. L.) [1918] A. C. 260.
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thereof on certain conditions; that plaintiff is privileged to assign a lease, without the consent of the landlord, because unreasonably withheld;' that plaintiff lessee under a ninety-nine year
lease is privileged (i. e., without forfeiture of the lease) to demolish
the building and erect a new one to be used for other than theater
purposes; " ' that the plaintiff's lease with the city, requiring him
to undertake extensive improvements is valid, over the objections
of a defendant taxpayer ;' that, without breaking or purporting to
break a contract-a deed, lease, charter party, etc.,--it means what
the plaintiff and not what the defendant claims.' In these typical
cases, no wrong or even hostile activity has been committed or
threatened-a condition, it may be observed, which justified judicial relief in various equitable actions long before declaratory
actions and judgments were specifically authorized. What is
u Manhattan Bridge Three-Cent Line v. City of New York, 204 App. Div.
89, 198 N.Y.S. 49 (1923).
1 Sarner v. Kantor, 123 Misc. Rep. 469, 205 N. Y. S. 760 (1925) ; Young v.
Ashley Gardens Properties, [1903] 2 Ch. 112 ("If we refuse a declaration
here, the lessee's property would diminish in value, as his assignee would
I cannot imagine a more
run the risk of being turned out by the lessor.
judicious or beneficial exercise of the jurisdiction to make a declaratory
order," by Cozens-Hardy, L. J.).
r1 Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore 229 N. W. 618 (Mich. 1930).
1OWoodward v. Fox West Coast Theatres, 284 Pac. 350 (Ariz. 1930). In
this case the Fox Theaters made a lease of fifty years with the City of
Phoenix for the rental of land for a theater, and agreed to build within two
Taxpayer Woodward
years a building costing not less than $300,000.
claimed by serving notice that the lease was illegal and void for eleven
The Fox Theaters as plaintiff thereupon brought an action
reasons stated.
for a declaration that the lease was valid and to quiet plaintiff's title as
The court said: "It would seem, in view of the improvements conlessee.
templated, their extent and the cost thereof, that plaintiff should, if possible,
be assured that the lease is valid before making improvements. The building
proposed to be constructed will become a part of the realty and, should the
lease be void or invalid and voidable, the investment would be a total loss to the
Safe and sound business demands that such questions be settled
plaintiff ....
before the expenditure of so large a sum as $300,000 and such questions should
be settled as early as convenient, because the convenant to pay rent begins
at the commencement of the lease, July 1929."
01Colorado & Utah Coal v. Walter, 75 Col, 489, 226 Pac. 864 (1924), that
plaintiff had the exclusive right to use certain waters rising on his land;
McCrory Stores Corp. v. S. M. Braunstein, Inc., 102 N.J. L. 590, 134 Atl. 752
(1926) (meaning of clause in lease); In re Devlin's Trust Estate, 284 Pa. 11,
130 Atl. 238 (1925), that a certain provision of a trust deed was void as contrary to public policy; In re Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265
(1925), that plaintiff, as life-tenant under a will, had power as lessor to
enter into a certain lease; Russian and Commercial Industrial Bank v.
British Bank for Foreign Trade, [1921] 2 A. C. 438, that plaintiff mortgagees
were privileged to repay a certain loan in rubles rather than pounds sterling
(this, without offering to redeem the mortgage); Elliott Steam Tug Co. v.
Charles Duncan & Sons, 34 T.L.R. 583 (1918), that a certain charter-party
is in force and that plaintiff charterers and not defendant owners were entitled to certain Government hire.
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visible is the existence of an opposing claim which disturbs the
peace and freedom of the plaintiff and, by raising doubt, insecurity, and uncertainty in his legal relations, damages his
pecuniary or other interests. A survey of some of the cases that
have been, decided under the procedure looking to a declaratory
judgment discloses it as an essential means of bringing to judicial
cognizance many important legal issues and of settling legal controversies before violence or hostile action has caused irreparable
injury.'
Representative Gilbert of Kentucky, in speaking on the federal declaratory judgments bill on January 25, 1928, described the
preventive function of the declaratory judgment in this apt
metaphor:'
"You have the same court, the same jurisdiction, the
same procedure, the same parties, and the same questions.
Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then
turn on the light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under
the declaratory law you turn on the light and then take the
step."
Judge Cardozo, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, has testified to its efficacy in these words :"
"I studied the subject of declaratory judgments before
the statute on that subject was adopted in this State. My
conviction of its utility has been strengthened by experience
of its practical operation. I have not felt at any time that
the remedy has been abused. I have been .impressed on numerous occasions with the belief that it has supplied a useful
expedient to litigants who would otherwise have acted at their
peril, or at best would have been exposed to harrowing delay."
And Chief Justice von Moschzisker of Pennsylvania added his
testimony to the effect that
"it has proved to be a most useful piece of legislation in our
State, and I can conceive of how it would be even more useful in the Federal courts; therefore I take the liberty of stating to you that, after five years of experience with the declaratory judgment as practiced in Pennsylvania, we of the
supreme court are satisfied that it serves the present times in
"See the list of typical cases printed in Report of Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 70th.
Cong., 1st sess., on H. B. 5623, April 27 and May 18, 1928, pp. 47-54.
"Cong. Ree., v. 69, No. 33, Jan. 25, 1928, p. 2108.
"Hearings before a sub-committee of the Senate, supra n.62, p. 55.
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a most excellent way, and actually avoids much of what
would otherwise be protracted litigation.' '
Te Statutes. Statutes authorizing declaratory judgments are
fairly modern. Although the Roman law was acquainted with the
procedure, and the Middle Ages developed it considerably,'* the
only English-speaking country to take it up actively was Scotland.
There it flourished from the fifteenth century on, having evidently been brought over from France and the Scotch judicial experience in Roman law. It took until the nineteenth century to reach
England, where its introduction was promoted by Lord Brougham
and other reformers. In 1846, Lord Brougham, in delivering his
opinion in the House of Lords in the case of Earl of Mansfield v.
Stewart,' said:
"I cannot close my observations in this case without once
more expressing my great envy, as an English lawyer, of the
Scotch jurisprudence, and of those who enjoy, under it, the
security and the various facilities and conveniences which they
have from the most beneficial and most admirably contrived
form of proceeding called a declaratory action. Here, you
must wait till a party chooses to bring you into court; here,
you must wait till possibly your evidence is gone; here, you
have no means whatever, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred,
of obtaining the great benefit of this proceeding."
Lord Brougham lived to see his proposed reform partially
adopted in an amendment to the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852,
which provided, in section 50, that
"no suit... shall be open to objection on the ground that a
merely declaratory decree or order is sought thereby, and it
shall be lawful for the Court to make binding declarations of
right without granting consequential relief."
This was given so narrow a construction by the courts, not
without criticism from bench and bar, that, under authority of the
power vested in the Supreme Court of Judicature by the Act of
1873, the Court issued an Order, XXV, rule 5 of 1883' which has
paved the way for a wide application of the declaratory judgment.
It reads as follows:
"No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on
the ground that a merely declaratory judgment is sought
thereby, and the Court may make binding declarations of
Hearings, ibid. p. 47.
Weismann, J. Die Feststellungsklage. Bonn, 1879.
5 Bell 139, 160.
'77 Statutory Rules and Orders 54.
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right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed,
or not."
So fully did the courts consider the declaratory judgment
merely a matter of procedure that they adopted it in its broadest
form merely by rule of court. The 1883 Rule, which is the parent
of most of the statutes or rules now adopted in nearly every
British possession throughout the world, was supplemented in 1893
by a further rule (Order LIV, A), reading as follows :"D
"In any Division of the High Court, any person claiming to be interested under a deed, will, or other instrument,
may apply by originating summons for the determination of
any question of construction arising under the instrument,
and for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested."
The American experience began with a brief general statute
of 1876 in Rhode Island, although limited authority to render
declaratory judgments was conferred at an earlier date in one or
two other states. Maryland adopted a declaratory judgment
statute in 1888. None of these statutes appear to have aroused
special interest and their use was desultory only. In 1915 New
Jersey passed an Act along the lines of the 1893 Order LIV, A,"
which has been applied in a number of cases, This, like the Florida
Act of 1919 and the Massachusetts Act of 1929, confines the power
to the declaration of rights under a written instrument. In 1919
Michigan passed a broad Act and from that time on, every legislative session has witnessed the accession of one or more states to the
list of states enjoying this procedure. Twenty-five states now have
this procedure, including several of the neighbors of West Virginia. The fact that over three hundred decisions have been rendered under them within ten years is an indication of their utility.
The number is increasing annually. It may be added that in England approximately 60 per cent of the cases in equity are brought
for declaratory judgments and in New Zealand about 25 per cent
of all actions are declaratory. This is a guaranty that those
familiar with the procedure recognize its value.
The American statutes have taken three general forms. The
09 Statutory Rules and Orders, 1893, p. 552.
7OThe New Jersey Act respecting the court of Chancery, Suppl., approved
March 30, 1915, Public Laws, 1915, c. 116, p. 185 § 7, reads as follows: " I Subject to rules, any person claiming a right cognizable in a court of equity, under
a deed, will or other written instrument, may apply for the determination
thereof, in so far as the same affects such right, and for a declaration of
the rights of the persons interested." See IN re Ungaro's Will, 88 N. J. Eq.
25, 102 Atl. 244 (1917).
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New York Act and Rules, which approximate the Connecticut and
a few other Acts, read as follows :'
"Section 473. Declaratory judgments. - The supreme
court shall have power in any action or proceeding to declare
rights and other legal relations on request for such declaration whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and
such declaration shall have the force of a final judgment.
Such provisions shall be made by rules as may be necessary
and proper to carry into effect the provisions of this section.
0 S

*

*

0 e

"Rule 210 - Practice assimilated. - An action in the
supreme court to obtain a declaratory judgment, pursuant to
section 473 of the civil practice act, in matters of procedure,
shall follow the forms and practice prescribed in the civil
practice act and rules for other actions in that court.
"Rule 211-Prayer for relief.- The prayer for relief in
the complaint shall specify the precise rights and other legal
relations of which a declaration is requested and whether
further or consequential relief, is or could be claimed. If
further relief be claimed in the action, the nature and extent
of such relief shall be stated.
"Rule 212--Jurisdiction discretionary.-If, in the opinion of the court, the parties should be left to relief by existing
forms of actions, or for other reasons it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the grounds on which
its discretion is so exercised.
"Rule 213-Verdict of jury on facts.-In order to settle
questions of fact necessary to be determined before judgment
can be rendered, the court may direct their submission to a
jury. Such verdict may be taken by the court before which
the action is pending for trial or hearing. The provisions of
sections 429 and 430 of the civil practice act apply to a verdict so rendered.
"Rule 214--osts.-Costs in such an action shall be discretionary and may be granted to or against any party to the
action."
The Massachusetts Act, which is confined to the interpretation
of written instruments, provides :"§1.
Section 3 of Chapter 213 of the General Laws is
hereby amended by adding after clause 'Tenth' the following
new clause: Tenth A, Providing that an action at law or a
suit in equity shall not be open to objection on the ground
71 CIViL PRACTICE AcT, § 473, and Rules thereunder.
The annotations of
the New York Act present the cases. New York has employed the declaratory
jadgment more frequently than any other state.

7-Statutes 1929, c. 186.
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that a mere judgment, order or decree interpreting a written
instrument or written instruments is sought thereby, and providing procedure under which the court may make binding
determinations of right interpreting the same, whether any
consequential judgment or relief is or could be claimed or
not, providing that nothing contained herein shall be construed to authorize the change, extension or alteration of the
law regulating the method of obtaining service on, or jurisdiction over, parties or to affect their right to jury trial.
"§2. This Act shall become operative on September first
of the current year."
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act which, with or without modification, has been adopted in most of the states, reads :"
"An act concerning and regulating declaratory judgments and decrees and to make uniform the law relating
thereto.
"Section I. ScoPE. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief
is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open
to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form and effect; and such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
"See. 2. POWER TO CONSTRUE, ETC. Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute,
ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.
(1924) 24 COL. L. REV. 416-422, and article, The
71 See legislative note in
Uniform Act on Declaratory Judgments (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 697. See also
(1921) 12 A. L. R. 63; (1922) 19 A. L. R. 1124; Borchard (1918) 28 YALE L.
J. 1, 105 and (1929) 3 CINN. L. REV. Z4-39; Boyd (1928) 15 VA. L. REV. 79;
Cooper (1922) ILL. L. REV. 436-455; Dunn in A. B. A. REP. (1920), pp. 384394; 3 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1353, p. 2780; Gates, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENNESSEE BAR ASS'N. 41-51 (1920); Gordon (1923) 9 VA.
L. REV. 169-195 and KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N. REP. (1921) 192-224; Hale (1924)
3 OR. L. REV. 232-235; Harrison (1921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 359-373; Hope
(1921) 4 ILL. L. Q. 126-130; Kerr (1919) 53 AMER. L. REv. 161; Levi (1922)
94 CENT. L. J. 75-85; H. R. Medina, Lecture X, pp. 207-245 in IMPORTANT
FEATURES OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE

ACT (N. Y. 1922); Posner (1928) 1 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 129-145; Riddell
(1921) 25 LAW NOTES 46-49; Schoonmaker (1920-21) 5 MINN. L. REV. 32-38
and 172-184; Sunderland (1920) 54 AMER. L. REV. 161-192, IoWA BAR ASS'N.,
80-97 (1921); (1917) 16 Mci. L. REV. 69; Torrey (1923) 8 IowA L. BULL.
81-91; Vinje (1920) 4 MARQUETTE L. REV. 106-117; Robert F. Wagner, Address before Otsego County Bar Ass'n., July 2, 1927, 15 p. Cong. Record, Feb.
1, 1930; Yankwich (1926) 3 NEw PAC. COAST L. J. 166-173.
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"See. 3. BEFORE BREACH. A contract may be construed
either before or after there has been a breach thereof.
"See. 4. EXECUTOR, ETC. Any person interested as or
through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or
other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of
kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a
trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or
insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal relations
in respect thereto:
"(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees,
heirs, next of kin or others; or
"(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees
to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their
fiduciary capacity; or
"(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction
of wills and other writings.
"Sec. 5. ENuERATION NOT ExcLusvE. The enumeration
in sections 2, 3 and 4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of
the general powers conferred in section 1, in any proceeding
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.

"See. 6.

DISCRETIONARY.

The court may refuse to ren-

der or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such
judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding.
"See. 7. REVIEW. All orders, judgments and decrees
under this act may be reviewed as other orders, judgments
and decrees.

Sec. 8.

SUPPLEmENTAL RELEF.

Further relief based on

a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever
necessary or proper. The application therefor shall be by
petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If
the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have
been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to
show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.
"See. 9. JURY TRIAL. When a proceeding under this act
involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may
be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact
are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court
in which the proceeding is pending.
See. 10. CosTs. In any proceeding under this act the
court may make such award of costs as may seem equitable
and just.
"Sec. 11. PARTIES. When declaratory relief is sought,
all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and
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no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties
to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves the
validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard,
and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State also be served
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard.

This act is declared to be

"See. 12.

CONSTRUCTION.

"See. 14.

PROVISIONS SEVERABLE.

remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief
from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status
and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and
administered.
The word 'person,'
"Sec. 13. WORDS CoNsTR=Ux.
wherever used in this act, shall be construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock company, unincorporated association, or society, or municipal or other corporation of any
character whatsoever.

The several sections

and provisions of this act except sections 1 and 2, are
hereby declared independent and severable, and the invalidity,
if any, of any part or feature thereof shall not affect or ren-der the remainder of the act invalid or inoperative.
"Sec. 15. 'UNIFORAITY OF INTERPRETATION. This act
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those States which
enact it and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws
and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and
decrees.
"See. 16. SHORT TITLES. This act may be cited as the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
"See. 17. TIME OF TAMING EFFECT. This act shall take
effect from and after its passage, the public welfare requiring
it." (The Tennessee provision.)
One reason for the length of the Uniform Act lies in the fact
that in many states the courts have no or little rule-making power
and a self-executing Act was hence desired. In fact, however,
aside from the requirement of jury trial for questions of factand even this may be assumed under general laws or constitutional
provision-rules are hardly essential, for the procedure is or should
be identical with that prevailing in any other action, with the one
exception of the prayer for relief, which seeks only a declaration
or determination of the rights of the plaintiff or the parties, instead of coercive relief by way of damages, injunction, specific
performance, or other mandate.
The procedure has now been so thoroughly tested in courts
throughout the country that it may be hoped that all the states will
soon find it to their interest to adopt this useful instrument for
the more speedy and effective administration of justice.
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